INTRODUCTION
[452] Whether the truth of a statement lowering the estimation of the person to whom it refers in the eyes of others exonerates the defendant in an action for defamation -in other words, whether veritas convicii excusat -2 is a question that, from a comparative perspective, has attracted ferociously polarised answers. There is no agreement on this point between legal systems; no agreement (and often little willingness to agree to disagree) among scholars as to what the law should be; in fact, there is a surprising degree of uncertainty in some
jurisdictions as to what the law actually says on the issue.
Does 'the truth excuse the defamation'? At a very high level of generality, it is fair to say that the position of the common-law tradition has consistently been to consider that, in civil actions, 3 the truthful character of a defamatory -i.e., in the categories of the common law, slanderous or libellous -statement justifies its utterance. As counsel for the defendant already put it in a 13 th century case before an English local court, 'veritas non est defamatio'. 4 On the other hand, the Roman-law tradition -where the civil redress for defamatory statements developed and, at least for a long time, continued to exist within the wider context of the law of iniuriae, that is to say, of insults [453] -never accepted truth as a defence in and by itself. If truth was to be relevant, it would normally be in conjunction with another factorfor example, an element of public benefit -or as evidence of something else which would be what in fact mattered -in particular, the absence of the required mental state. In spite of all manner of low-level complications, and even though Romanist learning always existed in the background as English law developed into a separate legal tradition, a clear dividing line can 1 Maîtrise DEA (Sorb), LLM (Lond) DPhil (Oxon). I am grateful to Helen Scott (University of Cape Town) for her ongoing help in sharpening my thoughts on the issue and for the use of her notes prepared for the BCL course on the Roman Law of Delict. Two anonymous referees saved me from further errors.
2 This is the traditional Scottish formulation (imported from canon law): see eg Hamilton v Rutherford (1771) Mor 13924, Hailes 439. Convicium is used here in the general sense of slander or defamatory words, not in the technical sense of a convicium in Roman law (on which see below, note 11). 3 Criminal defamation is excluded from the scope of this study because it is obvious -and undisputedthat the law of criminal defamation is pursuing different objectives from the civil law. It is therefore unsurprising, but rather uninteresting, that in all legal systems it has tended to have a conflicting position on the plea of veritas (see below, note 34). 4 2 Selden Society 82 (1294). The record has the word spelt 'defamacio'. On the significance of this statement in terms of protected interests, see below, 11. be observed on this question between what English-language scholarship calls the 'civil law' and the 'common law'.
For this reason, the examination of so-called 'mixed' legal systems, where elements of both traditions combined to give rise to the modern law, is almost bound to be of considerable interest: confronted with two conflicting positions on truth -justification in itself or notwithin two analytical framework that did not easily fit with one another -the law of slander and libel on the one hand, the actio iniuriarum on the other -how would these legal systems develop and what coherence of their own, if any, would they reach? This is what this paper sets out to explore in the context of one of the two leading uncodified mixed jurisdictions: South Africa. Because the main purpose is to analyse the position of the modern law against the background of its two possible sources, however, the first half of the paper will be devoted to setting out the position of Roman law and English law. While the latter is relatively straightforward, the former is a matter of significant controversy and will need to be examined in more detail. The sort of 'mixture', if indeed it was a mixture, which South African law has operated, will then be considered. ' (1918) 34 LQR 412. 6 Literally, 'iniuria' means 'not-right', 'wrong', 'unlawful conduct', 'injustice'; in its specialised sense of 'contumelia' (D.47.10.1 pr.; J.4.4 pr.), it has been variously translated with 'outrage', 'insult' or 'contempt '. terms, to a purely criminal response of the law.) In the classical law, iniuria had grown to such an extent from its -disputed -origins as prima facie to encompass any act whatever of the defendant which showed a contumelious disregard for the claimant, thereby injuring his feelings. A crucial ingredient of liability, which was implicit in the praetor's Edict but was brought to the fore by legal writers, would have been the mental element which came to be known as 'animus iniuriandi' -the term itself is post-classical -, 7 an undefined and difficult concept which we can provisionally translate with 'intention to insult'. 8 The question of the interests which iniuria protected as a wrong permeates this paper and will need to be returned to; but it is useful to mention at the outset Ulpian's statement according to which iniuria consisted in an injury to either corpus (physical integrity), fama (good name, reputation, fame, renown) or dignitas (dignity, worth, status, standing). 9 If we accept that the law of defamation is the law that pertains to injuries to reputation, which is a proposition that would be readily accepted in the context of both South African and English law, what we then have as we approach Roman law on its own terms is a law of defamation which operates under the general heading of a law of insults (iniuriae). This section of the law of iniuria which dealt with injuries to fama -in other words, the 'Roman law of defamation' -was the subject-matter of a specialised edict, known by its opening words as the edict 'ne quid infamandi causa fiat', in short 'ne quid' (literally, 'let nothing be done to bring disgrace [upon another]'). 10, 11 The relationship between the special edict dealing with injuries to reputation and the general edict on iniuriae is a matter of ongoing controversy; but there is no need for us to take a stance here since it is not disputed that, by the classical age at the latest, the special edict operated as an island of liability existing within the wider context of the delict of iniuria, itself a general wrong unified by the concept of contumelia. The Paulian snippet reads as follows:
Eum, qui nocentem infamavit, non esse bonum aequum ob eam rem condemnari:
peccata enim nocentium nota esse et oportere et expedire.
It is not right and just that any one who has defamed a guilty person should on that account be condemned; for it is both proper and expedient that the misdeeds of delinquents should be known.
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Interpretations. How is this to be understood? The fragment has given rise to a considerable number of conflicting interpretations both during the ius commune and on the part of modern probably reading back what became the dominant interpretation of the ius commune, took it as evidence of the fact that truth for the public benefit justified, but not truth simpliciter. 15 In turn, the nature of this 'public benefit' -however that element [456] be phrased -could be given a wide variety of interpretations. 16 If we ignore the rare, and obviously ill-thought, suggestion that truth would never be relevant, 17 we find at the most restrictive end of the spectrum Grotius, for whom the only situation where the truth could be spoken even though it was prima facie defamatory of another was 'when information is given to the authorities with a view to the punishment of crime'. 18 More mainstream was the interpretation according to which wrongdoers, in the sense of criminals (the meaning ascribed to 'nocentes' in Paul), 19 could be spoken the truth about -even if they had already been convicted -but not those who had committed a non-criminal, possibly non-blameworthy act, or whose faulty character or physique, rather than actions, was the subject-matter of the disputed words. At the other end of the spectrum, Matthaeus might have been the most favourably disposed towards truth, even though he evidently required more than truth simpliciter to justify. 20 There is no need to examine these interpretations in detail here, because it suffices for our purpose to note that almost all revolved around the need for an element of good for the community over and above truth to justify the author of the injurious statement, the few others requiring the absence of animus iniuriandi.
A hypothesis. This paper not being concerned primarily with Roman law, I will state my own understanding as a hypothesis, without trying to demonstrate it systematically -which, given the textual evidence, might not be possible at all. This understanding is that the latter above Intuitively, a legal system which does not accept that anyone could always call a thief a 'thief' and get away with it -because (as the New South Wales Law Reform Commission would put it many centuries later in perhaps the most succinct way) 'gratuitous destruction of reputation is wrong, even if the matter published is true' -26 such a system will insist that there should exist a sufficient common or greater good, served or caused or achieved by the attack, to outweigh and thus 'justify' the harm suffered. In other words, to follow the above 24 On the other hand, it is tenable for a legal system to say that true words are never actionable in defamation. But this does not mean that they will not be actionable as something else. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a legal system, even on the non-criminal side of the law, could justify the speaking of true words in all circumstances. Yet it is certainly possible, as the example of English law until 1974 show, to say that they never give rise to an action for the infringement of reputation, ie 'in defamation'. Whether this is just is an altogether separate question that need not be addressed here. 25 Burchell op cit note 13 at 34. Naturally, 'justification' must not be confused in that context with the specific defence of truth or truth for the public benefit. 26 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Defamation (Report 11) (1971) § 64. This is the one leading argument that the anti-veritas cohort has put forward over centuries. phrasing, the attack should not be 'gratuitous'. What this exactly entails might be difficult to flesh out; but the basic idea is clear and intuitive enough.
In turn, this requirement that the attack should not be gratuitous can be cast in two different ways which, at least in the great majority of cases, will overlap: it can be phrased in terms of an element of public benefit -whatever the precise words used and meaning ascribed to them -or in terms of a mental disposition on the defendant's part: the attack is not gratuitous either because it serves a good purpose or because it is not [459] motivated by sheer malice. Following the above terminology, the former relates to a justification (objective circumstances excluding unlawfulness) and the latter to an excuse (subjective mental state excluding fault).
To a large extent, one is the reverse side of the other. Thus, the defendant might have called the plaintiff a 'thief' because he wanted to bring him to a deserved punishment, or to protect the community against further wrongdoing on his part, or otherwise serve the good of the commonwealth; or he might have done it with no such good in mind. If he did not, then it is very likely, if not almost certain, that he will have been actuated by ill-will against the claimant, i.e. an intention to insult him or, to phrase it differently, a positive desire to cause him an injury.
27 This is what the post-classical writers would have called animus iniuriandi.
Although the correspondence is not perfect -for it still possible to speak truth that is in the public interest with spiteful intent and conversely to say, without any intention to insult, something which is true yet not objectively in the public interest -still, there is such a degree of overlap between 'truth for the public benefit' (or 'in the public interest': an objective defence negating unlawfulness) and lack of wrongful intent (a subjective defence negating fault) that it is very easy to see how, as far as issues of truth or lack thereof are concerned, the two could be used almost interchangeably by writers. In most cases, they would yield the same result.
A hypothesis (continued): the position of Roman law. As was seen, most authors of the ius commune reasoned in terms of an objective defence of public benefit negating unlawfulness.
The rebuttal of animus iniuriandi, when it was mentioned, would simply be the basis on which truth for the public benefit was justified. Animus iniuriandi having been pushed into the background, the debate would then move on to the definition of that element of public good. 27 Here, I follow De Villiers' terminology and distinguish desire from, on the one hand, will or intention and, on the other hand, motive. See De Villiers op cit note 22 at 388-9.
But reading this crystallisation back into the Roman law appears to be anachronistic and does not make sense within the context of the edict ne quid. To understand this, we need to recognise the specificity of that edict. Contrary to the other specialized edicts on iniuria, such as convicium or de adtemptata pudicitia, ne quid did not visit a specific type of conduct: prima facie any act, whether words or other conduct, can bring disgrace to another. As Daube put it, 'a man may undermine another man's reputation by an immense variety of means. He may do it by a straightforward statement. But he may also do it by oblique remarks, or even without any remarks'. 28 This raised specific problems when it came to the delineation of wrongful conduct. Self-evidently, not every conduct which infringes one of the interests protected by iniuria (whether through the general or a specialized [460] edict) should be actionable. Just as not every public clamour or attempt to seduce should be characterized as wrongful, so not every conduct which brings disgrace upon another ought to be actionable. In the case of convicium or de adtemptata pudicitia, the way the praetor dealt with this question was by limiting actionability to such facts that were described as 'contrary to public morals':
adversus (or contra) bonos mores. 29 The criterion was objective: only conduct that crossed the line of socially unacceptable conduct gave rise to an action. The objectiveness of the criterion would not have caused practical difficulties, because the specificity of the conduct visited by the edicts would have almost invariably entailed consciousness of wrongfulness on the defendant's part.
While theoretically possible, adopting such an approach in the case of defamatory incriminations under the edict ne quid would have had, given the sheer width of potentially liability-creating conduct, the practical and highly undesirable effect of turning the judge into an all-around censor of social behaviour. 30 In modern terms, we might want to say that this would have caused a considerable problem of legal certainty. Daube's argument, which seems entirely right, is that the praetor resolved this difficulty by using the defendant's intention as the means to control liability: actionability would turn on the latter's intention to bring disgrace upon the plaintiff -infamandi causa. behaviour. (The general edict cannot be straightforwardly reconstructed as having followed one or the other approach; but Helen Scott's view that the surviving texts show a tension between the objective boni mores as an older criterion of liability and animus iniuriandi as a later, subjective, criterion is both plausible and attractive.)
If it is true that animus iniuriandi was an alternative to boni mores as a control mechanism in the context of the edict ne quid -which fits very well with the available textual evidence, writers never speaking of 'public morals' in the context of passages clearly or even possibly referring to that edict -, 31 it follows that liability in the Roman law of defamation would have revolved exclusively around the subjective criterion of intention to insult: that the conduct complained of was objectively defamatory, only the absence of such an intention to cause the iniuria to the claimant would have relieved the defendant of his liability.
Truth was thus irrelevant in itself, although indirectly relevant insofar as it would help evidence that the defendant's purpose in making the incrimination had not been to insult the plaintiff but, for instance, to make the 'misdeed of delinquents … known'. If this is right, then the crystallization of (subjective) animus into an (objective) defence of 'truth for the public benefit' would have been a post-Roman -and imperfectly accurate -'objectivization' of the classical position.
(2) English law
The position of English law can be dealt with more succinctly, in part because there are sufficient records to remove most elements of speculation, and also because it has already been dealt with in other fora. 33 The English (civil) law of defamation is the reunion, in mathematical terms, of the two causes of action known as slander -the action of trespass upon the case for words -and libel. Whereas the law of criminal libel, like the Roman law of libelli famosi (at least until the time of Justinian), did not recognise truth as an exculpating 31 I am following the list of texts provided, in three groups, in Daube op cit note 5 at 471-84. 32 This position is strengthened by C.9.35.5, which applied to convicium not iniuria famae, but clearly states that absence of any intention to insult exculpated the defendant from liability ('Si non convicii consilio te aliquid iniuriosum dixisse probare potes, fides veri a calumnia te defendit'). Contra De Villiers op cit note 16 at 87. 33 Including, most recently, my own paper: E Descheemaeker ' "Veritas non est defamatio"? Truth as a Defence in the Law of Defamation ' (2011) I have argued elsewhere that this departure from the principle is an oblique attempt on the part of English law to protect, not reputation, but privacy (in Roman terms, a species of dignitas). 44 In a legal system where there is no direct protection of that interest, any protection will have to be indirect; and one 'solution' English law has adopted has been to exploit an action which, according to its own rhetoric, is geared at the protection of reputation. This is one example, among others, of how the English law of defamation has become an embryo of actio iniuriarum in its own right -a process that I have argued is wrong for several reasons.
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One of them can be seen in its effect on truth. As a matter of fact, it seems an analytical necessity to say that a [463] true statement cannot impinge on someone's deserved reputation.
On the other hand, if what is complained of is that the statement violated the defendant's dignity, then truth has to be irrelevant: broadcasting to the world the serological status of an HIV+ person or taunting them for their poverty or hunch back is -if one accepts that this is wrong -wrong regardless of truth; arguably it is in fact because these statements are true that they are wrong (if they were false, they would still be wrong, but for a completely different reason).
It is thus relatively easy to understand how an action that aims to protect both fama and dignitas, as the Roman actio iniuriarum did and, to a slight extent, the English action on defamation does, will end up having a defence of truth set somewhere between the two extremes of 'veritas (semper) excusat' and 'veritas (semper) non excusat' -'truth (always) excuses' and 'truth (always) does not excuse' -as it strives to protect interests that are pulling 40 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 12-13. 41 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 8. 42 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 7. We are now in a position to turn our attention to the mixed legal system of South Africa to see (1996) , 157-60. By 'purism' (on which see E Fagan op cit note 46 at 60-4) is meant the endeavour on the part of some, especially Afrikaans-speaking scholars and judges, to root out the 'impure' English additions to the Roman-Dutch system. By 'pragmatism' is meant the willingness to draw from English sources, regarded as more suited on the whole to the modern world, whenever the need was felt to depart from the customary rules of Roman-Dutch law.
(1)
The structural framework
To the present day, the actio iniuriarum remains a category within South African law. Both courts and legal scholars reason in terms of iniuria. However, under the combined influence of Grotius -who built upon Roman scholarship to bring to the fore the various interests protected by the law, and identified 'wrongs against honour' as a separate category -and of the English law of slander and libel, South African law also thinks in terms of the wrong of defamation (laster in Afrikaans). But defamation, even though it is routinely regarded as a law unto itself that can be treated as a separate entity, is known to exist within the wider context of the actio iniuriarum: similarly to Roman law, it is iniuria as it applies -if possibly with its own specific rules -to reputation (eer). This has important consequences in that, in particular, animus iniuriandi remains in ordinary cases a requirement for liability. Although its necessity was strongly attacked, in particular over the first half of the twentieth century (at the same time as English law moved towards a paradigm of strict liability), it never disappeared andwhatever exactly animus is taken to mean -48 it has been clear again for half a century that it is not a hollow fiction and it is still an ingredient of liability: there can normally be no liability though it is accepted that it is different from the notion of public interest as it applies to the defence of fair comment.
(a)
The position of courts
(i) Before the Union of 1910
If we look at the foundational period of South African law in the 1827-1910 period 51 (a period during which there was virtually no home-grown scholarship apart from court judgments), 52 we find that -subject to the emergence at the end of the century of a 'dissenting' strand, to which we shall return -the defence was incorporated smoothly from Roman-Dutch law into the law of the land. Naturally, until the establishment of a Union of South Africa, there was technically no 'South African' law, but laws specific to the different polities established on the territory, whether under British or Boer control: the Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal and
Orange. It would however be misleading to grant equal consideration to these: the dominant force was unquestionably the Cape of Good Hope, where a Supreme Court had been established in 1828. In the absence of any colonial pronouncement, however, Roman-Dutch law applied in all these territories.
The Cape. In the Cape Colony, we find the defence of truth for the public benefit already established in Mackay v Philip (1830), the first reported case of defamation in the Supreme Court. 53 The phrase 'public benefit' (or equivalent) is not used; but the idea appears transparently in the judgment. 54 The reasoning of the court is less transparent, but it does seem to be that truth for the public benefit rebuts the presumption of animus iniuriandi having arisen from the publication of the defamatory words. As to the authority for both propositions given rise to such a prolific, and generally self-questioning, body of legal scholarship.
(c) Analysis
As mentioned, this desire to let offenders live down their sinful past is a concern whichwhether worthy of support or not -has to my mind nothing to do with the protection of reputation. It really is an attempt to protect the claimant's privacy, which itself is a species of dignitas not fama. This is bound to be significant because, the moment the action is framed as an iniuria, and more specifically -to use Roman law's own taxonomy -as an iniuria verbis (that is to say, an insult committed by words), a whole body of principles is brought into play that does not fit easily with the general principles of a 'law of defamation' -a later concept which has been superimposed onto the law of iniuria. If one thinks, as modern English law does, in 81 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 11ff. 82 On this point, see also below, 26. Along the same lines, one could mention Mason J's argument in Dunning v Quin and Others op cit note 61 at 39 that the defence of truth simpliciter would 'afford a most undesirable encouragement and protection to the blackmailer' (cited in Leibenguth v Straaten op cit note 65 at 1207). 83 This paragraph focused on courts; but the same imbalance can be seen in textbooks and other scholarly works. For instance, Jonathan Burchell's opus, the most detailed treatment of the law of defamation ever to have been written in the country, goes no further than stating the same idea according to which '[t]here comes a time when the ashes of the past must be left to die' (Burchell op cit note 13 at 210). 84 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 17ff. The argument does not appear to have been made in the context of South African law. See however Groenewald v Homsby 1917 TPD 81 at 85, which comes close to it (citing judgment at first instance); also Burchell op cit note 13 at 210.
terms of the protection of deserved reputation, then veritas as a defence follows as a logical consequence; but if one thinks, as the Romans did, in terms of contumelious behaviour, then truth is prima facie irrelevant and will only bite when, coupled with an additional element, it becomes sufficient to negate the required mental element without which there can, by definition, be no contempt. 85 The result of this logic is plainly to be seen in South African law until the [471] present day. The problem of South African law is that it has, at heart, a law of verbal injuries, which it has inherited from Roman law. Under the combined influence of Grotius and English scholarship, it later carved out a concept of defamation ('iniuriae famae', as it were); but it left unaddressed the frictions caused by the fact that the two categories, while overlapping very significantly, are not the same. Most but not all defamations are verbal injuries; most but not all verbal injuries are defamatory. Moreover, they do not follow entirely the same logic.
The question whether veritas convicii excusat exposes this tension, as it makes sense within one analytical framework but not the other: within a law of verbal injuries, truth is irrelevant in itself but can be part of the rebuttal of the necessary intention to insult; within a law of defamation understood as the protection of deserved reputation, it is an analytical necessity.
But to what logic does the category of 'truth for the public benefit' answer? In itself, none that can be identified. If the purpose of the action is to protect the plaintiff's deserved reputation, it is too narrow. If the purpose is to protect his reputation whether deserved or not, or his privacy, it is too wide. If it is to redress contumelious behaviour, it is absence of animus iniuriandi -of which truth for the public benefit is only an imperfect approximation -86 which should avail as a defence. The scope of the defence in the modern law belies the fact that South African law still thinks (if imperfectly) in terms of verbal injuries, not defamation.
Thus, if it wants to move from the law of contumelious behaviour that it has inherited from Roman law to the law of injuries to reputation that it claims to be having, it will need to detach the protection of fama from the actio iniuriarum and, among other adjustments, work out the consequences of what this means in terms of the defence of justification.
85 Above, 5. 86 Imperfect for the reasons noted above (at 8). It is important to note that, the defence (justification) of truth for the public benefit having ossified from the excuse of lack of animus iniuriandi, the latter has become irrelevant: the defendant will not fail in his defence, if indeed his words were true and objectively for the public benefit, even if he spoke out of an improper, evil or spiteful motive: see Williams v Shaw (1884) 4 EDC 105 at 148; Burchell op cit note 13 at 215-16 (with the caveat of SA Mails Syndicate v Hocking op cit note 63, where it was -puzzlingly -suggested that in some extreme circumstances an improper motive might defeat the defence of truth for the public benefit). book quickly established itself as a work of reference with great authority of its own. 89 On the specific topic of truth in the law of iniuria, however, De Villiers was not afraid of standing in a minority of one. His book was in effect an all-out attack against the unwillingness of the law to recognise truth simpliciter as a defence to a defamation or a verbal injury. 90 As far as Roman law is concerned, he did not hesitate to write there that 'there can be no doubt that in Roman law as a general rule the truth of a statement which in itself would be defamatory if untrue, was a sufficient justification for its utterance'. 91 To this 'general rule' he only 87 On him see Girvin op cit note 51 at 114, E Kahn op cit note 66 at 45-6, A A Roberts op cit note 66 at 357. 88 Above, note 66. 89 Percival Gane spoke of it as 'a most admirable and spacious disquisition on the title': P Gane The Selective Voet (1957) 201.
90 I use both terms even though they are not synonymous, because difficulties with the defence of veritas stem largely from the friction between them -see above, section 'analysis'. De Villiers does not appear to have identified the problem; and he certainly did not discuss it. His starting point had, following Voet, to be iniuria and, within iniuria, iniuria verbis; but in his commentary, he adopts the perspective of defamation throughout. 91 De Villiers op cit note 16 at 103. 
Mitigation of damages
Whereas, subject to the above caveat, truth simpliciter was never accepted as a good justification to an action in defamation, it is interesting to note that it was readily accepted as a factor to be taken into account when it comes to quantum of damages: if the defendant had no reputation to speak of in respect of the incrimination complained of, damages will be reduced (to the discretion of the Court, although presumably they could not be brought down This stance taken by the law on mitigation of damages, which we might want to describe as 'pragmatic', reveals to my mind that South African law is unable to live up to its own logic. It does not want to recognise truth simpliciter as a defence, out of a (prima facie laudable) attempt to protect people against the malicious or gratuitous injury that could be 97 Above, 7. 98 This point might be worth emphasising since it is counter-intuitive. Even someone who is happy with the proposition that defamation protects reputation in the wider sense (i.e. whether deserved or not) is likely to consider that the non-thief who has been called 'a thief' has lost more than the actual thief. While it is possible that this would be true in terms of non-reputational interests (for example privacy), it is incorrect as far as reputation is concerned. The loss -that is to say the diminution, or potential diminution, of one's esteem in the eyes of the community -is the same in both cases. (Two complications arise here, but they both cut across the divide between true and false incriminations: one is that the extent of the injury will depend on how plausible the alleged facts are; the other is the extent to which these facts might already be known within the community.) The reason why the point presently made is not readily accepted is that we cannot accept that the truth of the defamatory statement would really be indifferent -that is to say, we cannot escape the proposition that defamation ought to protect deserved reputation, even when, de lege lata, the law takes a different stance.
made to their reputation -a form of enforced forgiveness on the part of the community, at least in the external for -; yet it cannot accept the natural consequence of this position, which is that wrongdoers might receive money damages from even good-faith members of the community who would disclose their wrongdoing outside the objective boundaries of public interest. An English author had put the same concern more bluntly when he spoke of One point which has not been given much thought in the debate, perhaps because it is obvious and what is obvious tends to be overlooked even when it is important, is that the scope of the defence of truth for the public benefit depends on the breadth of, and therefore the meaning given to, the concept of 'public benefit'. It is easy to see that, the broader the concept of public benefit is defined, the broader the defence becomes and the closer it will get to the defence of truth simpliciter. At the extreme, if anything uttered was [475] considered to be ipso facto for the public benefit, then the categories of 'truth of the public benefit' and 'truth' would, in fact, coincide. The point is all the more important because 'public benefit' is not a category that most people would readily understand in a similar way. It has little intrinsic meaning; in fact, it is difficult to think of a legal construct which has a wider range of plausible understandings. This is not the place to engage into an in-depth examination of the content of the notion of 'public benefit' (or 'interest') in South African law; but a few remarks can profitably be made. The first one is that the concept has never been defined in South African law, either by courts or scholars. The inquirer who turns to cases and textbooks to find out more will typically be greeted with the rather unhelpful proposition that what amounts to public benefit is a question of fact that is highly dependent on all the circumstances of the case. 100 Beyond that, what might be given is a list of situations where facts have been held to 99 'Least of all will [the law] allow such a person lucrari ex mala fama,-to make a profit of his bad fame' (F Holt The Law of Libel 2 ed (1816) 271). 100 Eg Neethling op cit note 49 at 166 ('Generally public interest in a defamatory remark will depend on the circumstances of each case as well as the convictions of the community (boni mores) at that particular time'); Mahomed v Kassim op cit note 77 at 9 ('In deciding whether what was said was for the public benefit all the be, or not to be, in the public interest.
101 (Interestingly, the example most frequently advanced in both types of literature of matter which is not for the public benefit is the raking up of past behaviour of clearly public figures, about which there would be little scope for argument on the 'public benefit' part of the test.
The second remark is that, while the requirement of public benefit clearly has some bite, in that defendants do fail on this account, the dominant impression when one tries to infer general principles from casuistic case law is that the bite is limited. This is reflected in
Gronewald v Homsby (1917), 104 perhaps the only case before the Supreme Court where there was an argument -not within the court, but at a distance with the view taken at first instance -around what constitutes public interest or benefit. A man had committed adultery, in a small settlement, with a woman whose husband was away. The defendant, a close friend of the husband, complained to the superintendant. The facts were admitted to be true by both parties; but was their disclosure in the public interest? At first instance, the magistrate held that they were not because the plaintiff did not have a public position and lived privately. This was reversed in the Supreme Court, which obviously held to a wider understanding of public benefit, albeit in no clear way. One judge mentioned that, although the claimant was a private man, his adultery was public and the defendant had therefore acted in 'good faith' in reporting circumstances surrounding the publication must be taken into account'); Van Wyk v Steyn op cit note 68 at 71 ('the question whether a particular thing is in the public interest is not a question of law but a question of fact, which can hardly be determined by appealing to Voet or to any other authority. It falls to be determined by reference to conditions and circumstances which vary from century to century and from country to country'); Stanley v Central News Agency op cit note 62 at 491 ('It would be impossible to give an exhaustive statement of the subjects which a court would hold to be of public interest, and it is not desirable to endeavour to do so. Obviously such a list must change from time to time, according to the changing conditions of society and the circumstances'). 101 The most complete, if now outdated, overview of authorities is provided in ARB Amerasinghe Defamation in the Law of South Africa and Ceylon (c 1969) Ch 31. See also Neethling op cit note 49 at 154-5. 102 Eg Neethling op cit note 49 at 154; Graham v Ker op cit note 59 at 187. This might need to be limited, as in England, by an additional factor -perhaps the non-gratuitousness of the disclosure. Thus, in Patterson v Engelenburg op cit note 72 at 361, Wessels J opined that 'a scandal cannot be raked up unless it is done for the public benefit', suggesting that it is in fact possible for a past transgression to be revived in the interest of the community. If we accept that public benefit is very largely a mirror image of lack of malice, this is essentially the position of England after the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (above note 43). 103 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 11ff. 104 Groenewald v Homsby op cit note 84.
it (thus reintroducing considerations of animus within the defence); 105 another simply held that in the face of such 'gross immorality' the defendant had been 'justified' in making the defamatory statement; 106 as to the last, he opined that, even though disclosing immorality would not qualify per se as being for the public benefit, it was, in that particular case, 'in the interest of that little community that things like this should not happen' (the idea presumably being that disclosing the facts would go towards bringing the adulterous relationship to an end). Reading between the lines, the requirement of the court seems to be that there should be a 'good reason' to speak, whether that good reason be the fact that the disclosure of the fact was not pointless -objective justification -or that it was not malicious -subjective excuse. In one word, perhaps, that it should not be gratuitous (or vexatious). This is a hurdle to jump for the defendant, but a comparatively low one.
Significantly for the present argument, there is at least one line of thinking that favours an even lower hurdle and thus, mechanically, an even greater proximity as defences between truth 'for the public benefit' and truth simpliciter. It is best exemplified in the suggestion, which has been described as the 'locus classicus' 107 of the law relating to the defence of truth, One always has to be cautious when examining intellectual genealogies, for influences and, even more so, the lack thereof are very difficult to prove or disprove. But what one can say after having examined the facts is that, on this particular issue, there is no good evidence of borrowing -in either direction. While it is transparent when reading the cases that the conflicting position of English law was known and appreciated, there are few documented attempts on the part of counsel to introduce it into the law of the land; and these never prospered. Reliance remained heavily on Roman-Dutch sources; and there is no sense that this would be no more than lip service. As to the leading opponent to the Voetian position, [478]
he was exclusively educated in South Africa and would go on to become Professor of ZuidAfrikaansche Recht in Leiden. 109 His brother John did spend a stint in England, being called to the bar by the Middle Temple; and it is true that he has often been charged with unduly borrowing from English sources. 110 Influence is therefore not to be ruled out; at the same time, the fact that others had the same inclination without any English tropism, while no 109 Girvin op cit note 51 at 114. Leiden is the very place where Voet had studied. 110 See eg Girvin op cit note 51 at 120. similar challenge was posed by many judges educated -at least in part -in England, means that it would be imprudent to infer a link.
Generally, in a context of what was at times an extreme tension between proponents of the 'pure' Roman-Dutch law and those of the Anglicisation of the Colony, between
Afrikaans-and English-speaking scholars, judges and seats of learning, it is if anything the remarkable isolation of the truth debate from these tensions that should be noted. We do not find the sort of dividing line, let alone battleground, that we might have expected to find; and the minoritarian dissenting strand that was highlighted does not appear to be explainable on this sort of basis. In South Africa, as in fact in a mirrored way in England, we find two camps with two broadly coherent positions; in both cases, we have a majority imposing its position early on, and a minority that never manages to reverse the status quo yet does not give up and obtains some concessions from the other party. But, just as it would seem absurd to describe English law as a mixture of the 'pure' common law and civilian thinking because of Fitzjames CJ 111 and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 112 so it appears rather misguided to speak of South Africa as a mixed legal system on this particular point. Rather, there is in both jurisdictions an -unhappy -coming together of two principled positions; but these are philosophical positions, in particular on the value of truth and that of oblivion, rather than emanations from two legal traditions (even if it is true that, historically, these have dovetailed into one another). While neither system is entirely satisfied with its own position, and tensions are visible in both, South African law has remained firmly committed to the choice made two thousand years ago by the Romans: veritas convicii non excusat.
111 Above, note 39. 112 Above, note 43.
